

Satellite in the Making

ALLIED WARTIME DIPLOMACY: A Pattern in Poland. By Edward J. Rozek. 481 pp. New York: John Wiley & Sons. \$6.95.

By OSCAR HALECKI

WHEN Hitler invaded Russia in 1941 he sealed his own doom—he also sealed the doom of Poland. Russia's Joseph Stalin was ready to admit that the Soviet-German Treaty of 1939, which partitioned Poland, had lost its validity. But in spite of the British-Polish alliance of that same year, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was prepared to recognize that Russia had a right to claim most of its share in that partition on other grounds, and he was unable or unwilling to realize that Russia wanted also to convert the rest of Poland into a Soviet satellite.

A pattern in dealing with Poland was thus established, which, even after America's entrance into the war, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was unable or unwilling to change. That pattern was strictly followed from July, 1941, when Churchill and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden requested from the Polish Government an unconditional surrender to Russia's initial terms, until July, 1945, when implementing the Yalta Declaration of Poland's dependence on the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States withdrew recognition from the Polish Government and granted it to the Russian puppets. All of this is recalled to us in Edward J. Rozek's "Allied Wartime Diplomacy."

That dark chapter in history is certainly not unknown. Churchill's own memoirs reveal the basic facts no less clearly and dramatically than do the memoirs of Polish military and diplomatic leaders. But it is only now, thanks to this book by Mr. Rozek, a former Polish citizen and currently Professor of Political Science at Colorado University, that the voice of the victims is heard, not in the form of personal recollections, but through documentary evidence. Exactly as in Churchill's six volumes, the story is illustrated by the full text of diplomatic reports, confidential letters, official records and private notes of secret conferences. Far from making the book less readable, such a method makes the presentation more convincing and absorbing.

MUCH of this rich material has been taken from the papers of Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, former Prime Minister of Poland, and from his oral comments. The papers are quoted as "Official Government Documents" of Poland—until Mikolajczyk's resignation from the Premiership in November, 1944, and naturally they are a primary source for the sixteen-month

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period when he was in office. His "private files" have been used for the study of the following period until his escape from Communist Poland in October, 1947, but they add comparatively little to the sad story of Yalta and to the book, "The Rape of Poland," in which ten years ago Mikolajczyk tried to justify his acceptance of a vice premiership in the Communist regime.

That decision, contrary to the policy of the Polish Government, was made under the strongest pressure of Churchill and the British Foreign Office. Even more violent had been that pressure in 1943 and 1944, when Mikolajczyk still defended to the best of his ability the rights of Poland against allies and enemies alike.

The testimony of the man who went through such an ordeal made it easy for Mr. Rozek to blame British and American wishful thinking that Stalin could and should be appeased. But Gen. Wladyslaw Anders should not have been blamed for acting without such illusions as early as 1942 and again in 1945. And Churchill's invectives, which questioned the Polish contribution to the Allied war effort, would appear even more shocking, if the author (who has himself such an honorable war record) had mentioned at least the Polish part in the fighting at Monte Cassino and not concentrated so exclusively on Mikolajczyk's experience.

THAT experience is indeed extremely instructive as far as British policy is concerned, but the American side of Allied diplomacy is illustrated in this book rather by rumors and personal glimpses than by new facts. As to the Polish side, there remains much research to be done in the papers which have been preserved by other members of the wartime Polish Government and in the rich collections of the Sikorski Institute in London.

Even so, Mr. Rozek has made an outstanding contribution to the study of what, according to William Y. Elliott's excellent foreword, might be called "The Betrayal of Poland." Mr. Rozek avoids writing in a spirit of bitterness, but in his conclusion he rightly refutes the often used argument "that if the Yalta Agreement had been carried out by the Soviets, there would not have been any betrayal of democratic principles and that the countries which are now under Soviet control would still be free."

Any thoughtful reader must agree with him that "this argument is indefensible, at least in the case of Poland." He writes: "Once the Soviets had established their own brand of government inside Poland, it was obvious that it would have to be subservient to Soviet purposes, which were clearly defined in Communist writings well before either Teheran or Yalta, as were Hitler's objectives in 'Mein Kampf.'"

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